A Priori or A Posteriori? by Tahko, Tuomas E.
1 
 
The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics (2020), ed. by Ricki Bliss and JTM Miller, pp. 353–363. 
 
27  
A Priori or A Posteriori? 
Tuomas E. Tahko 
1 The role of the distinction in metametaphysics1 
The distinction between the a priori and the a posteriori is important both in 
epistemology and in metaphysics. What makes the distinction important in 
metametaphysics is the fact that many questions in metametaphysics are closely 
related to the source of metaphysical knowledge and our epistemic access to that 
source. For instance, since many topics in metaphysics concern the realm of abstract 
objects such as sets and numbers, the question about our epistemic access to entities of 
this type is relevant. This issue is closely tied to Benacerraf’s Problem (Benacerraf 
1973), which concerns the causal isolation of the realm of abstract entities, especially 
mathematical entities (for discussion, see Horsten 2018). Another area of knowledge 
that seems causally isolated from us is metaphysical modality – obviously a very 
important area of inquiry in metaphysics.2 If we do have knowledge about 
metaphysical possibility and necessity, then what is the source of that knowledge? 
One important reason why this question is pressing in metametaphysics is that many 
contemporary metaphysicians strive for a naturalistic understanding of metaphysics, 
but the realm of metaphysical modality may be considered especially problematic in 
this regard, because there does not seem to be a simple way to acquire knowledge 
about it by a posteriori means.3 
 However, it should be noted right at the outset that there is no particular reason 
to think that a priori reasoning or the question about the relationship of the a priori and 
the a posteriori is a special problem for metaphysics. As Karen Bennett (2016) has 
convincingly argued, all areas of philosophy will face similar issues, since a priori 
reasoning is employed all over philosophy. Nevertheless, a priori knowledge is often 
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thought to be a challenge for, if not incompatible with, naturalism, so the fact that 
metaphysics sometimes seems to deal with knowledge accessible only by a priori 
means poses a problem for naturalistic metaphysicians (see Jenkins 2013). We will 
discuss all these issues in more detail in what follows but let us first consider some 
preliminaries. 
 There are at least four different areas to which the a priori-a posteriori 
distinction can be applied. These are knowledge, justification, reasoning, and 
methodology. There is obviously a very large literature on each of these areas, so we 
will not be discussing them all in detail.4 One way to understand the difference 
between knowledge and justification is in terms of truth – one may be justified in 
believing a certain proposition p without it being true, but knowledge that p arguably 
also requires that p is true. We need not dwell on the details of the analysis of 
knowledge, but it is arguably a priori knowledge in particular that is of interest in 
metaphysics, whereas a priori justification could be considered to fall under the remit 
of epistemology. This is, very roughly, what Albert Casullo’s analysis of the 
distinction might suggest: we may distinguish between a non-reductive and a 
reductive approach to a priori knowledge, where the first is concerned with the 
analysis of the concept of a priori knowledge, while the latter is concerned with a 
priori justification (cf. Casullo 2003: 10). Reasoning and methodology are of course 
closely tied to justification, but methodology is a somewhat broader notion. For 
instance, if we say that metaphysics generally involves a priori methods, this could 
mean that metaphysicians justify their claims about the subject matter of metaphysics 
in terms of conceivability arguments, intuitions, logic, or other similar tools that are 
typically (but not without exception) considered non-empirical. 
2 How can we distinguish between a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge? 
It may seem relatively easy to give a simple definition of a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge and distinguish them on that basis. A priori knowledge is simply 
knowledge acquired by non-experiential or non-empirical means, whereas a posteriori 
knowledge is acquired via experience or the senses, empirically. This does not yet 
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specify whether it’s necessary that either type of knowledge was acquired by a priori 
or a posteriori means though. If a computer provides us with information about a 
complicated mathematical issue, then we acquired that information by a posteriori 
means, assuming that the computer is a reliable source of this type of mathematical 
information. But a skilled mathematician might be able to acquire the same 
information by a priori means. Yet, it seems that there may be some forms of 
metaphysical knowledge that we could not have arrived at by empirical means at all. 
If we have knowledge about any metaphysical necessities or metaphysical possibilities 
that are nomologically impossible, then this type of knowledge might be a case in 
point.5 For our purposes, it is this type of knowledge – knowledge that seems 
necessarily a priori – that makes for the most interesting case study. 
 So, we have started with the assumption that a priori and a posteriori 
knowledge can be distinguished via the notion of experience. But there are many well-
known problems concerning this. For instance, Laurence BonJour (1998: 7–11) 
mentions two of the most apparent problems concerning the a priori and experience: 
the problem of how we define ‘experience’ itself and how the a priori is supposed to 
be ‘independent’ of it. In the first case, the problem is to determine the correct scope 
of experience. Do mental processes count as experience? How about mathematical or 
philosophical reasoning that relies on certain learned patterns? Should only perceptual 
information count as experiential? How does memory fit in with all of this? The 
second traditional problem involves issues concerning concept acquisition as a 
precondition for a priori knowledge. We need concepts to formulate our beliefs, and it 
seems that those concepts must be learned experientially before we can even 
formulate any beliefs. 
 Problems with the distinction remain, even assuming that we can overcome 
these issues and define ‘experience’ in such a way that a clear-cut distinction can be 
made and agree that concept acquisition does not contaminate a priori knowledge with 
a posteriori elements. One central issue is that it is exceedingly difficult to find pure 
examples of a priori or a posteriori knowledge. Consider an example that one might 
take to be particularly easy: 
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[T]he scattering of birds causes you, via the belief that birds have scattered, 
to infer, with the help of a number of other beliefs, that there is a cat in the 
vicinity. 
(McGinn 1975–76: 199) 
This example of perceptual information concerning birds, which is used to infer a 
further proposition, does seem to be relatively easy to classify as a posteriori 
knowledge. However, there is inference involved, presumably based on inductive 
information concerning previous cases of bird scattering. But inference is a form of 
reasoning, regardless of what the initial premises are (i.e. whether the premises are 
themselves a priori or a posteriori). Based on an appropriate set of premises, we can 
deduce that the vicinity of a cat is one likely explanation for the scattering of the birds. 
What is the nature of this form of reasoning? Can it be accurately described as ‘a 
posteriori reasoning’, or is that even a sensible notion? Would we not be inclined to 
say that all forms of reasoning are a priori? One could of course suggest that only pure 
perceptual information, whatever that may be, is truly a posteriori and anything that 
we might deduce from that perceptual information is in fact a priori. This way we 
would end up with the curious result that most of our knowledge must be a priori, 
since we have arrived at it via a priori means, using our capacity to reason 
deductively. However, this is not a common understanding of a priori knowledge. It is 
more common to think that whenever the acquisition of a piece of knowledge involves 
a posteriori elements, that piece of knowledge should be classified as a posteriori. 
After all, if there was an a posteriori element that was required at some point, then the 
piece of knowledge in question is not fully independent of experience. So, it would 
only be pure a priori knowledge in the sense of complete independence of experience 
that counts as a priori knowledge. 
 Setting aside the issue of concept acquisition, we may then end up, instead, 
with the result that only logic counts as a priori, in virtue of it being a purely deductive 
science (McGinn 1975–76: 199–200). Now, if deduction is a mark of the a priori, and 
we need deduction to be able to form a proposition concerning a certain state of 
affairs, such as there being a cat in the vicinity at a location where bird scattering has 
been observed, then it would appear that any kind of inferred propositional knowledge 
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like this will include a priori elements, even if the present proposal would classify it as 
a posteriori. Much, if not all, of the underlying information may have originated in our 
senses, but at some point, reasoning will enter the picture. 
 So, we have a bit of a dilemma. We use a priori methods all the time and we 
regard them as reliable. But since there is almost always some preliminary 
information involved, except perhaps in formal logic, it appears that there isn’t much 
pure a priori knowledge. The issue is further complicated by the fact that interesting 
types of a priori knowledge, such as that concerning metaphysical modality, are not 
usually thought to be available to us via logic. Instead, many think that acquiring this 
type of knowledge requires resorting to methods of inquiry such as conceivability or 
intuitions. If these methods of inquiry are considered a posteriori, then we end up with 
the somewhat surprising result that even knowledge of metaphysical modality is a 
posteriori. 
 There is a further issue. Since it seems that often we can come to know the 
same thing both by a priori and a posteriori means, we would need to refine the 
distinction if we don’t want the same piece of knowledge to be both a priori and a 
posteriori. After observing this issue, Timothy Williamson concludes that: 
Perhaps the best fit to current practice with the term is to stipulate that a 
truth is a posteriori if and only if it can be known a posteriori but cannot be 
known a priori. 
(Williamson 2013: 293) 
Now, we have been applying the distinction to ways of knowing and justification 
rather than truths, and Williamson’s suggestion here would result in a similar picture, 
because he effectively suggests that it is the way that we can come to know a truth 
that determines its status, so that’s what we should focus on. However, as he goes on 
to note, even this approach faces a problem if we accept Kripke’s (1980) famous case 
in favour of contingent a priori truths and necessary a posteriori truths. If there are 
contingent a priori truths, such as Kripke’s example concerning the standard metre, 
then it seems that they must also be knowable a posteriori – this is in fact how most of 
us come to learn about the length of the standard metre, even if it was a priori for 
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those who initially proposed the definition. If Kripke is right, the link between 
apriority and necessity is severed and we lose a seemingly easy way to identify a 
priori truths with necessary truths and contingent truths with a posteriori truths. 
 What is the upshot regarding the a priori-a posteriori distinction? Given that it 
is very difficult to properly distinguish a priori and a posteriori knowledge, one might 
think that the distinction is not very significant at all. As we have seen, even if we do 
find a way to draw the distinction without too much vagueness, we may end up with 
the result that there is very little knowledge of one or the other type. Williamson 
(2013) has suggested something similar, arguing that even though the distinction can 
be drawn, the differences between a priori and a posteriori knowledge are superficial. 
The reason for this is that in both cases, experience does play a role and according to 
Williamson this role is more than ‘purely enabling’ – like it would perhaps be in the 
case of concept acquisition – but also less than ‘strictly evidential’, like it might be in 
the case of pure perceptual information. 
 The problem with distinguishing the enabling and evidential roles of 
experience is related to our understanding of ‘experience’ itself. We have noted some 
of the problems surrounding this already, many of which arise from having to account 
for ‘inner’ as well as ‘outer’ experience: not all experience is perceptual, we often 
appeal to experience that is purely internal to us as well, such as when we perform a 
calculation. But it’s not clear whether the process of calculation is playing an 
evidential role here, since we might think that the inner experience of calculating just 
enables us to access certain mathematical truths. Yet, a similar story can be told about 
outer experiences as well: there is a certain experience that we associate with 
perception, but the knowledge that we gain via this process concerns external matters, 
so once again it could be argued that experience is only mediating our access to 
certain external facts, hence playing an enabling rather than an evidential role. So, it 
won’t do to draw the a priori-a posteriori distinction in terms of inner and outer 
experiences, because either type of experience can be interpreted as evidential or 
enabling. 
 This rather negative result does not mean that we couldn’t find a reasonable 
way to draw the a priori-a posteriori distinction. The problem, rather, is that all 
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reasonable ways to draw the distinction will be somewhat stipulative and even 
supposedly clear cases of one or the other type of knowledge may end up being 
classified differently. The consensus in contemporary epistemology, insofar as there is 
one, seems to be that the coherence and significance of the distinction are under 
serious threat.6 But perhaps this does not mean that the distinction is useless. In the 
next section we will outline an approach that embraces the vagueness of the 
distinction and also explains why it may not be fruitful to attempt to classify a certain 
truth outright as either a priori or a posteriori. 
3 Bootstrapping and cyclical processing 
Motivated by the difficulty of demarcating a priori and a posteriori knowledge, some 
philosophers have abandoned the project of trying to find a clear definition of either 
type of knowledge. Instead, it is suggested that there is a very subtle interplay between 
different types of inquiry and both are needed in order to acquire any knowledge at all 
(Chakravartty 2013; Lowe 2011, 2014; Morganti and Tahko 2017; Tahko 2008, 
2011). 
 Another source of motivation for a revised view is more closely related to the 
role that a priori knowledge is sometimes thought to play in metaphysics. For 
instance, a priori methods in metaphysics are often associated with intuitions or 
conceivability, but many metaphysicians are quite sceptical of these methods. E.J. 
Lowe is one such philosopher. He argues that a view taking intuitions as evidential in 
metaphysics is ‘fundamentally misguided and leads inexorably to an anti-realist 
conception of metaphysical claims’ (Lowe 2014: 256). However, Lowe himself is not 
against a priori knowledge or a priori methods in metaphysics; he just thinks that they 
have little to do with intuitions or conceivability. Instead, Lowe argues that it is 
knowledge of essence that has a central role in metaphysics and that the process of 
acquiring this knowledge should not be considered completely independent of 
experience, but rather as proceeding in a ‘cyclical manner, by alternating stages of a 
priori and a posteriori inquiry’ (2014: 257). 
 Those sympathetic to the idea that a priori and a posteriori inquiry go hand in 
hand in metaphysics often also consider the same to be true of scientific inquiry. We 
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will return to science and naturalistic metaphysics in section 5, but it may be helpful to 
consider an example from scientific inquiry here to demonstrate the degree to which a 
priori and a posteriori methodologies can be intertwined. I borrow this example from 
Tahko (2011: 157), where the ‘cyclical’ relationship between the a priori and the a 
posteriori is referred to as ‘bootstrapping relationship’. 
 Consider the phenomenon of gravitational redshift, which refers to the change 
in the wavelength of light and other electromagnetic radiation when it travels from a 
stronger gravitational field to a weaker one. This effect of gravity on light was 
predicted already by Newton, but Newton’s results relating to the phenomenon were 
partly inaccurate, as he relied on the corpuscular theory of light. When light is 
conceived as an electromagnetic wave instead, the phenomenon of gravitational 
redshift needs to be reconsidered, as it appears that the wavelength of light could only 
change from one place to another if the flow of time also changes. This mystery was 
of course solved by Einstein’s special theory of relativity, which models how the flow 
of time can indeed change, relative to a given frame of reference – the famous 
example of twins ageing at different rates because one of them is travelling close to 
the speed of light is a case in point. So, it was Einstein’s theory of general relativity 
that correctly predicted the gravitational redshift phenomenon. Einstein’s work, 
however, was not empirical. It was only the Pound-Rebka experiment in 1959 which 
correctly measured gravitational redshift, and this experiment is often also considered 
to have verified Einstein’s theory. 
 There is of course a lot more detail in this example and it should be noted that 
we are here dealing at the level of complete theories about light and electromagnetic 
radiation rather than a single proposition. However, we could focus just on the simple 
proposition <Gravity bends light>, which is effectively what is responsible for the 
phenomenon of gravitational redshift. Now, this phenomenon is not something that we 
would have been likely to look for if we didn’t have some theoretical reasons to do so. 
These reasons were already apparent in Newton’s theory, which predicted that gravity 
would influence light. But Newton’s theory was based on false assumptions about the 
nature of light. Later, experiments with light showed that it behaves much like an 
electromagnetic wave, and the original theory concerning gravitational redshift could 
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not accommodate this. Accordingly, since Einstein’s theory predicted different values 
for the phenomenon, it became an important test case for his theory. 
 We can now simplify a little and reconstruct the long history of gravitational 
redshift in terms of the proposition <Gravity bends light>. Newton’s theory represents 
the first a priori step in the bootstrapping relationship. Newton of course had empirical 
information about gravity that he used to build his theory on, but there are good 
reasons to think that extending that theory to light was quite independent from 
experience, since we don’t observe the influence of gravity on light without very 
sensitive equipment. Moreover, Newton’s corpuscular theory of light was mistaken, as 
experiments later confirmed. Thus, we have an a posteriori falsification of Newton’s 
original theory concerning the interplay between gravity and light even though the 
proposition <Gravity bends light> is true. So, Newton was actually partly correct 
when he asserted (let us imagine), the proposition. Einstein’s work represents a new a 
priori step from the established a posteriori framework, which had falsified Newton’s 
theory about gravitational redshift. After his theory was empirically verified by the 
Pound-Rebka experiment (and others), it also became a part of the a posteriori 
framework. On this basis, it seems wrong to say that the proposition <Gravity bends 
light> would be either purely a posteriori or purely a priori. Depending on which 
aspects of this story we emphasize and how strictly we define the a priori and the a 
posteriori, either result could be derived. The upshot is that it is often more accurate to 
say that a priori and a posteriori methods are intertwined in a quite intimate 
relationship, which is better described as cyclical or as bootstrapping. 
 Let us now move on to some applications of the a priori-a posteriori distinction 
in (meta)metaphysics. 
4 Connection to modal epistemology 
We have already noted that one area where one might think that a priori reasoning is 
needed is knowledge of metaphysical modality and indeed modal epistemology more 
generally. This is a topic where conceivability, for instance, has been traditionally 
employed as a source of evidence. But there have been recent developments in the 
area of modal epistemology as well that point toward a need to re-evaluate the role of 
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a priori and a posteriori methods. Specifically, while it may once have been common 
to regard all knowledge of metaphysical modality as a priori, there are now many 
philosophers sympathetic to versions of modal empiricism (e.g. Fischer and Leon 
2017), where attempts have been made to account for at least some of this knowledge 
in terms of a posteriori methods. So, we can divide the accounts of the source of 
modal knowledge into two rough categories: modal rationalism and modal 
empiricism. 
 Modal rationalism encompasses intuition- and conceivability-based approaches 
of the type defended, for instance, by George Bealer (e.g. 2004) and David Chalmers 
(e.g. 2002), and also the essence-based account of E.J. Lowe (e.g. 2012). Bealer 
defends an intuition-based account, whereas Chalmers defends a conceivability-based 
account as a part of a broader rationalist picture. Lowe’s approach is slightly different, 
since he thinks, following Kit Fine, that metaphysical modality is grounded in 
essence, so modal epistemology becomes a special case of the epistemology of 
essence. 
 We do not need to dwell on the details of the various approaches to modal 
epistemology.7 But it will be interesting to briefly discuss one key question regarding 
the relationship of a priori and a posteriori methods in modal epistemology (we 
continue to work with the – admittedly problematic – assumption that if a proposition 
is knowable only with the help of a priori methods, then we should classify that 
proposition as a priori). This is the question of unification, that is, are any of the 
various approaches to modal epistemology able to account for all modal knowledge or 
do we need to resort to various different kinds of methods to account for all modal 
knowledge? The starting point here should presumably be that, all other things being 
equal, a unified account, a single explanation for all modal knowledge, should be 
preferred. Two ways to unify the account would be to argue that all modal knowledge 
is acquired by a priori means or that it is all acquired by a posteriori means (and 
perhaps also in terms of the very same method, such as conceivability). 
 However, the unified approach has been forcefully challenged in recent work, 
especially by modal empiricists. A partial motivation here may be naturalistic, i.e. to 
avoid a commitment to a priori methods insofar as possible. Indeed, it seems right that 
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there is some modal knowledge that can be reached by a posteriori means, such as via 
perception. Moreover, as Carrie Jenkins (2010) has suggested, modal empiricism can 
be understood as a view according to which experience ensures the reliability of our 
modal knowledge. On Jenkins’s version of the idea, experience provides an epistemic 
grounding for our concepts. Interestingly, since concepts are also the basis of our 
conceptual abilities, conceivability itself would appear to need this experiential basis. 
This issue is obviously related to the distinction between experience as enabling and 
as evidential, so we end up with the same problems as above. 
 Yet, there are also reasons to think that not all modal knowledge can be 
acquired by a posteriori means, such as modal knowledge concerning abstract objects 
or nomologically impossible yet metaphysically possible matters. So, either way, 
proponents of a uniform account of all modal knowledge will face great difficulties, at 
least insofar as this uniformity is expected in terms of the a priori-a posteriori 
distinction (there are more fine-grained ways to understand uniformity, as specified in 
Wirling 2019, but our focus here is on the a priori-a posteriori distinction, for obvious 
reasons). Perhaps this constitutes another reason to avoid using this distinction as the 
basis for distinguishing different positions such as modal rationalism and modal 
empiricism (cf. Tahko 2017). 
5 Connection to science and naturalistic metaphysics 
One reason to be interested in the a priori-a posteriori distinction in the context of 
metametaphysics is the desire to strive for the most naturalistic and scientifically 
respectable epistemology for metaphysics as possible. Assuming that the a priori-a 
posteriori distinction can be made in the first place, one might think that it provides us 
with at least a rough tool to distinguish between naturalistic and non-naturalistic 
approaches to the epistemology of metaphysics. Unfortunately, this is a naïve attitude. 
Not only is the distinction itself unlikely to be sharp enough to provide any useful 
input on this question, but a closer look quickly reveals that even the most 
‘naturalistic’ area of science will need input from methods of inquiry that can be 
reasonably classified as a priori. We have already seen a rudimentary example of this 
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in section 3, with reference to Newton and Einstein. Here’s Anjan Chakravartty’s take 
on the matter: 
The degree to which and the ways in which the many domains of 
investigation that come under the heading of ‘the sciences’ are empirical is 
highly variable. As a consequence, the distinction here between a priori and 
a posteriori methodology cannot simply be superimposed 
unproblematically on metaphysics and the sciences, respectively. 
(Chakravartty 2013: 33–34) 
Chakravartty brings this issue up precisely in connection to the prospects of 
naturalized metaphysics, arguing that the distinction between non-naturalistic and 
naturalistic metaphysics cannot be simply made on the basis of the a priori-a posteriori 
distinction. This is of course the expected result given what we have already learned 
about the distinction. But maybe there are more subtle ways to draw the difference 
between non-naturalistic and naturalistic metaphysics? Chakravartty (2013: 32) 
speculates that it may be the idea of a priori theorizing ‘with no significant empirical 
tethering’ that is responsible for the hostility towards some, apparently non-
naturalistic, approaches to metaphysics. Of course, if what we have observed in earlier 
sections is correct, there simply is no such area of metaphysics, indeed, there seems to 
be no area of human inquiry whatsoever which would not take advantage of both a 
priori and a posteriori resources. It is important to recognize that this by no means 
entails that all areas of metaphysics would be unproblematic, epistemically speaking. 
It only means that no area of metaphysics should be considered problematic just 
because it employs a priori methods.8 Or if it is, then the same problems propagate to 
other areas of philosophy as well (cf. Bennett 2016), and to the sciences. 
 This is not the place to pursue arguments to the effect that the sciences, to 
variable extents, employ a priori methodology. Instead, it may be worthwhile to take 
an entirely different angle on the issue, namely, why do we think that the methods 
used in metaphysics and philosophy are a priori at all? This has been recently 
discussed by Daniel Nolan (2015), who argues that the ‘armchair’ methods used in 
philosophy could just as well be classified as a posteriori. Nolan suggests that these 
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methods generally involve the senses playing a role that is not merely enabling. So, 
once again we encounter the distinction between enabling and evidential roles. Here, 
the role of the senses is taken to be something more than a necessary part of the 
acquisition of concepts. Nolan identifies four possible tasks of this type for the senses. 
We will discuss each of them briefly. 
 The first is Assembling and Evaluating Commonplaces. This task amounts to 
the analysis of such stories as the one about (the statue of) Goliath and Lumpl, the 
piece of clay of which Goliath is made.9 Nolan suggests that we know only a 
posteriori that there are statues made of clay and that such statues can be smashed 
without destroying the clay. But the real interest of the suggestion is that philosophers 
can make surprising ‘discoveries’ on the basis of such commonplaces, which are 
seemingly available to everyone on the basis of a posteriori knowledge. For instance, 
the realization that Goliath and Lumpl have different persistence conditions has 
important upshots for metaphysical debates about composition. However, there may 
still be room to argue that the relevant philosophical work is nevertheless a priori. For 
one might insist that we need to have some grasp of the kind of thing that statues and 
lumps are before we are in any position to draw the philosophically important 
conclusions (cf. Lowe 2012). 
 Nolan’s second a posteriori armchair task concerns New Theoretical 
Alternatives. The fairly uncontroversial idea behind this task is that once a set of 
theoretical alternatives is already known, philosophers can come up with new versions 
of these theories or combine different theoretical frameworks to the effect that a 
unified theory can be constructed – all from the armchair but apparently without 
resorting to a priori inquiry. Nolan mentions David Lewis’s neo-Humean framework 
as an example; indeed, Lewis made a tremendous effort to combine laws, causation, 
counterfactuals, chance, and dispositions into a unified theoretical framework, the 
value of which is undeniable regardless of whether Lewis is correct about all the 
details. This certainly seems like a reasonable and valuable task to be conducted from 
the armchair and since all the data is, in a sense, already available in previous theories, 
the task itself would seem to require no further inquiry, a priori or otherwise. 
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 Perhaps it might still be objected that even once all the data is available it is a 
complicated task to determine all the implications of bringing together different 
theoretical alternatives. So, one might think that such a task will not be possible 
without further interpretation of the alternatives; thus, if the interpretative work 
requires metaphysical a priori inquiry, then the task cannot be completed simply in 
terms of a posteriori armchair inquiry. Be that as it may, since this task is in some 
sense secondary (given that metaphysical inquiry surely doesn’t start from it) it is 
perhaps of less importance whether it is truly a priori or a posteriori. 
 A related, third task discussed by Nolan is Integrating Past A Posteriori 
Investigation. This important task focuses on determining which discoveries of 
various disciplines should inform our overall world view as well as the relations 
between these disciplines. But Nolan readily admits that this task apparently involves 
much more than just armchair work: we may need to conduct actual scientific 
experiments to determine what the exact link is, say, between psychology and 
linguistics, or physics and chemistry. Nolan does point out that at least in certain 
cases, the information needed to engage in the integration task may be considered 
‘commonplace’ in the sense discussed regarding the first task. One particularly 
striking example might be quantum mechanics and its apparent violation of 
determinism: while the specifics of the situation are probably far from commonplace, 
it is now so widely known that quantum mechanics causes problems for determinism 
and classical physics more generally that the integration task can effectively proceed 
from the armchair. Indeed, much of the seminal work in this area was done already in 
the early 1900s and the philosophical debate about the interpretation of the 
experimental data has been ongoing ever since. Still, one might again argue that the 
interpretation of the relevant theories, which is surely required before the integration 
task can begin, could just as well be considered a priori. The core idea, in any case, is 
that work on theories or ideas that are widely spread and established could count as 
armchair work even if the original work that resulted in those theories was not 
armchair work. 
 The fourth and final task that Nolan proposes is Applying Theoretical Virtues. 
By ‘theoretical virtue’, Nolan means things like internal consistency, external 
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coherence, simplicity, explanatoriness, fertility, unificatory power, and other such 
comparative as well as internal virtues. It should be noted that it is not untypical in the 
literature discussing theoretical virtues to assume that they are part of a priori 
methodology (see Paul 2012). But Nolan may very well be correct in questioning this 
assumption, because the process of ‘applying theoretical virtues’ is rarely elaborated 
on. He suggests that it’s epistemically better to accept a theory that better satisfies 
these theoretical virtues. An obvious explanation for this is that such theories are more 
likely to be true. Yet, other attempts to justify theoretical virtues can be made; Nolan 
mentions that they can sometimes be justified with reference to other theoretical 
virtues. For instance, unificatory power may often promote further simplicity and 
unifying two theories may also increase explanatory value. Hence, the appeal to 
unificatory power could be justified in terms of these other virtues, if they are 
considered valuable. Perhaps a more direct justification could be drawn from 
predictive success, as simpler theories may provide accurate predictions. Nolan’s 
suggestion is that this assessment can be conducted in the armchair since it relies on 
established evidence rather than direct empirical work. 
 Interestingly, if Nolan is correct about the first three tasks, then even many of 
the ‘inputs’ of this fourth task can be considered to derive from a posteriori armchair 
work. If the commonplaces, new theoretical alternatives, and integration are all 
armchair activities, then the results they produce, the more sophisticated theories, are 
already largely a product of armchair work. We can then further compare these 
sophisticated theories in the armchair, by applying theoretical virtues. 
 The picture that emerges from Nolan’s proposal may seem attractive, since it 
corroborates much of philosophical methodology without resorting to the 
controversial notion of apriority. Of course, some philosophers would likely consider 
this to be a disadvantage, since if the a priori is to have any place in philosophy, then 
its best defence is exactly that a priori inquiry is needed in cases such as those 
described by Nolan. A more deflationary reaction to this discussion would be to say 
that we have a mere terminological debate in our hands. Indeed, does it even matter 
whether the armchair methods discussed are a posteriori or a priori, as long as they are 
reliable? 
16 
 
6 Concluding remarks 
The conclusion of our discussion regarding the a priori-a posteriori distinction and its 
role in metaphysics is somewhat negative. The distinction can be drawn and there are 
various ways to avoid its arbitrariness, but none of the reasonable accounts seem to 
help to settle issues such as the status of modal knowledge, the demarcation of science 
and (different areas of) philosophy, or the prospects for naturalized metaphysics. This 
does not mean that the distinction could not have its uses, but we should be modest in 
our attempts to use it when it comes to addressing the above issues. It may be more 
promising to examine the interplay of a priori and a posteriori elements in certain 
areas of reasoning, perhaps with the goal of improving our overall methodology. 
NOTES 
1 The discussion in this entry follows and develops on material in Tahko 2011, 2015. 
2 For discussion about modal epistemology and the role of modal knowledge in 
metaphysics, see Sonia Roca-Royes’s and James Miller’s entries in this volume. 
3 For discussion on versions of naturalistic metaphysics, see Matteo Morganti’s entry in 
this volume. 
4 See for instance Williamson 2000 for an extensive discussion. 
5 However, the issue is not quite as simple as that. There is a relatively new trend in modal 
epistemology to develop modal empiricist accounts, some of which attempt to provide an 
empirical basis also for knowledge about metaphysical necessity and possibility. See the 
articles in Fischer and Leon 2017. 
6 For a good overview of some of these challenges, see Casullo 2015. See also the essays 
in Boghossian and Peacocke 2000. 
7 Modal epistemology is covered in more detail in Sonia Roca-Royes’s entry in this 
volume. 
8 Again, for further discussion on various accounts of naturalistic metaphysics, see Matteo 
Morganti’s entry in this volume. 
9 See Gibbard 1975 for the original example. 
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